Ideals and reality often diverge. If we have made such strides in the last fifty years in many source disciplines of cognitive science individually (computer science, linguistics, mathematics, neuroscience, psychology), why has this not manifested as massive progress in fundamental understanding of the mind? Where is the glorious cognitive utopia promised by our large advances in empirical methods, the scale and availability of data, and the unreasonable effectiveness of engineering tools?
The root of this tension must, at least partially, reside in a distinction between prediction and explanation. It should be obvious to a reasoned thinker that an observation and its cause are two very different objects: this is echoed in the theoretical study of language in the divide between a speaker's i(nternal)-language —the system for generating and interpreting sentences — from their e(xternalized)-language; the utterances and texts that we can actually record. Here i-language is the intended object of scientific study despite e-language being the paradigmatic (and perhaps necessary) locus of measurement.
Attempts to collapse this distinction are endemic. This has, perhaps, been brought to a head by modern so-called AI systems whose application draws no such distinction between predicting external behavior and explaining its internal cause. This "collapsed" view, in fact, has a long history, as Celsus described a prominent school of Greek physicians nearly two thousand years ago: "[this group does] indeed accept evident causes as necessary; but they contend that inquiry about obscure causes and natural actions is superfluous, because nature is not to be comprehended." But if messy, stochastic observations are all we have, then why bother?
In this seminar we take an optimistic view: in order to treat the study of cognition as a mature science we must re-emphasize a commitment to the idea that the world (mind included) has a mechanistic basis that can be understood as such. This seminar will cover a mechanistic understanding of mental representations in language. We will explore how factors such as perception, memory, learning, categorization, and conceptual development interact with and constrain the properties of human language and inference, including its acquisition, processing, and variation.
Course Policies
There is no official textbook for the course as we will almost exclusively
read primary papers from the relevant literature. All readings assigned
throughout the term (both required and supplementary) will be posted to the
course schedule/Dropbox (Ask Spencer or Eric for access!)
With the goal of fostering focus, discussion, and the exchange of ideas,
the use of screens (laptops, phones, etc.) will not be permitted during class.
Any visual aids will be provided via physical materials (e.g. printouts or projections).
As a paper/discussion-centric seminar, the primary component of course grades
(50%) will be calculated based on active participation and attendance.
Students will also be required to submit a short document (less than a page)
each week before class with notes/reflections from the assigned readings
(20% of the overall grade).
Finally, students will write a term paper (a research squib),
which will make up the remaining 30% of the grade. There will be no HWs,
quizzes, or tests.
The instructor will attempt to provide all reasonable accommodations to students upon request. If you believe you are covered under the Americans With Disabilities Act, please direct accommodations requests to Vice President for Student Affairs Matthew G. Schoengood.
The course takes place (in person) at the Graduate Center, and students are expected to attend all classes (in person). However, students who have reason to believe they may be contagious with an infectious disease should contact the instructor and stay home. Other absences will not be excused, and the instructor reserves the right to tie grades to attendance records.
We're all trying to do a good job in life. I want to call out here that I, a human being, wrote this. It is not boilerplate or a template. We have put a lot of time and effort into creating a positive, rigorous course and environment for intellectual pursuit. Please try to uphold that goal as well.
In line with the Student Handbook policies on plagiarism, students are expected to complete their own work. The general ethos of the integrity policy is that actions which shortcut the learning process are forbidden while actions which promote learning are encouraged. Studying and discussing notes, papers, and ideas together provides a fruitful avenue for learning and is encouraged. Using a classmate’s solution or AI slop in your submitted notes or your term paper, however, is prohibited because it circumvents the learning process. If you have any questions about what is or is not permissible, please contact your instructors.
The instructors reserve the right to refer violations to the Academic Integrity Officer.
Schedule -- (n.b. subject to change)
January 27th: On Descriptive vs Explanatory adequacy; Performance vs Competence; Marr's level of analysis
Required reading:
Aspects. Chapter 1.
Supplementary readings:
Firestone, C. (2020). Performance vs. competence in human–machine comparisons. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(43), 26562–26571.
Marr, D. (1980). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. MIT Press.
February 3rd: Explanations vis-à-vis phenomenological laws: the case of frequency and lexical access
Required reading:
Murray, W. S., & Forster, K. I. (2004). Serial mechanisms in lexical access: the rank hypothesis. Psychological Review, 111(3), 721.
Supplementary readings:
Morton, J. (1969). Interaction of information in word recognition. Psychological review, 76(2), 165.
Norris, D., & McQueen, J. M. (2008). Shortlist B: a Bayesian model of continuous speech recognition. Psychological review, 115(2), 357.
February 10th: Optimization(?) for the grammar: generation vs. evaluation as bottlenecks
Required reading:
Supplementary readings:
February 17th: No class today
February 24th: Making sense of gradience and discreteness in perception and categorization
Required reading:
Caplan, S., & Durvasula, K. The discrete perception of continuous speech.
Supplementary readings:
McMurray, B. (2022). The myth of categorical perception. The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 152(6), 3819-3842.
Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B. C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of experimental psychology, 54(5), 358.
Estes, W. K. (1956). The problem of inference from curves based on group data. Psychological bulletin, 53(2), 134.
Massaro, D. W., & Cohen, M. M. (1983). Categorical or continuous speech perception: A new test. Speech communication, 2(1), 15-35.
Caplan, S., Hafri, A., & Trueswell, J. C. (2021). Now you hear me, later you don’t: The immediacy of linguistic computation and the representation of speech. Psychological Science, 32(3), 410-423.
March 3rd: Details to follow.....
Required reading:
Supplementary readings:
March 10th: On effects and causes (diachronic and synchronic) of properties of the lexicon
Required reading:
Caplan, S., Kodner, J., & Yang, C. (2020). Miller's monkey updated: Communicative efficiency and the statistics of words in natural language. Cognition, 205, 104466.
Supplementary readings:
Piantadosi, S. T., Tily, H., & Gibson, E. (2012). The communicative function of ambiguity in language. Cognition, 122(3), 280-291.